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THE LAW OF LYING: THE DIFFICULTY OF PURSUING
PERJURY UNDER THE FEDERAL PERJURY STATUTES
lindaf harrison
I. INTRODUCTION
A young woman meets her friend for lunch to continue an ongoing discussion
describing her sexual affair with a married man who happens to be the
President of the United States.' She tells her friend that in anticipation of her
upcoming deposition in a case which charges the President with sexual harassment,2
the President has not only asked her to sign an affidavit denying the affair, but tells
her that he intends to deny it in his deposition in the same case.' The friend,
unbeknownst to the young woman, is secretly taping this conversation for use by the
Independent Counsel appointed to investigate allegations of wrong-doing by the
President while in office.4 The details of this affair were previously unknown.
However, the tape recording, along with subsequent statements made by the young
woman to the grand jury, eventually became evidence against the President in the
impeachment proceedings against him which arose from this luncheon
conversation.'
As revealed in the tape recording, when President Clinton appeared at his
deposition on January 17, 1998, he denied the existence of an affair with Monica
Lewinsky and, in fact, referred to her falsely sworn affidavit in support of his
denial.6 This deposition was conducted in the presence of federal courtjudge Susan
Webber Wright, who presided over the sexual harassment case.7 During the
* Associate Professor of Law, Nova Southeastern University, Shepard Broad Law Center. J.D.,
American University, 1982. 1 would like to thank my former colleagues at Georgia State University
College of Law, Linda Robinson and Jennifer Chiovaro, for their helpful comments, and my colleague
at Nova Southeastern University, Steve Friedland, for his encouragement.
Use of lower case in name is at the request of the author.
1. This is obviously a description ofthe events leading up to the impeachment ofthen-President
William Jefferson Clinton. The young woman described above is Monica Lewinsky, her luncheon date
was with Linda Tripp. The Independent Counsel was Kenneth Starr. This information is taken from
the Impeachment Referral Report of Independent Counsel Kenneth Starr to the Committee on the
Judiciary, U.S. House ofRepresentatives, submitted September 9, 1998 [hereinafter Starr Report]. See
also SUSAN SCHMIDT & MICHAEL WEISSKOPF, TRUTH AT ANY COST KEN STARR AND THE UNMAKING
OF BILL CLINTON (2000).
2. Jones v Clinton, 990 F Supp. 657 (E.D. Ark. 1998). The charges in this case alleged that
Clinton made a lewd pass at Paula Jones while he was governor of Arkansas and she was a state
employee, The case was dismissed on April I, 1998 on a finding that his conduct did not rise to the
level ofactionable sexual harassment. Id. at 667-68. The case was settled in 1998 for $850,000. Jones
v. Clinton, 161 F.3d 528 (8th Cir. 1998).
3. SCHMIDT & WEISSKOPF, supra note I, at 25.
4. Id. at 23.
5. SCHMIDT & WEISSKOPF supra note 1, at 257
6. Starr Report, supra note 1, at 10.
7 See id. at 6.
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deposition, the prosecution attempted to ask the President about the affair, which
might have occurred with Ms. Lewinsky during his presidency ' At that point, the
President's lawyer objected to that line of questioning as based on innuendo,9 and
referred to Ms. Lewinsky's sworn affidavit in support of his objection." He
explained to Judge Wright that, in her affidavit, Ms. Lewinsky had sworn "that
there is absolutely no sex of any kind in any manner, shape or form with [the]
[P]resident."" When asked about the affidavit, President Clinton stated that the
affidavit was "absolutely true."' 2  Shortly after this deposition, the President
publicly denied the relationship. 3
After taping the lunch meeting between the two friends, the Independent Counsel
confronted Ms. Lewinsky and eventually secured her cooperation in their
investigation of the President. 4 In exchange for immunity for making a false
statement in her affidavit," Ms. Lewinsky agreed to testify truthfully before a grand
jury and to provide the prosecution with details of her affair and also with a blue
dress on which she claimed she had discovered semen stains belonging to the
President. 6
After prosecutors secured Ms. Lewinsky's cooperation and obtained the blue
dress and a detailed statement from her, President Clinton was called before the
grand jury on August 17 1998.' 7 In this appearance, the President admitted to
engaging in "conduct that was wrong," but insisted that these "encounters did not
consist of sexual intercourse" or "sexual relations as I understood that term to be
defined at my January 17 1998 deposition."' 8 When asked about Ms. Lewinsky's
false affidavit submitted to the court during his deposition, Clinton replied, "in the
present tense ... that would be a completely accurate statement."' 9 When pressed
to explain, Clinton said, "[i]t depends on what the meaning of the word is is. If is
8. ld.at9-10.
9. Id. at 10. Clinton had denied any and all such affairs on December 23, 1997 in his
interrogatory filed during discovery. The interrogatory requested "Please state the name... of (federal
employees) with whom you had sexual relations when you (were) ... president of the United States."
To this request, the President, under oath, stated "None." Id. at 8.
10. Id. at 10.
11. SCI-IMIDT& WEISSKOPF supra note 1, at 238. She also claimed in that affidavit that she had
"never had a sexual relationship with the [Piresident." Id.
12. Starr Report, supra note 1, at 10. Based on this line of question and answer by the president
and his attorneys, Judge Wright held "Clinton in contempt of court, pointing to 'clear and convincing
evidence' of'false, misleading, and evasive answers that were designed to obstruct thejudicial process'
in the Jones deposition." ScHMI'r& WEISSKOPF, supra note 1, at 277. Judge Wright ordered Clinton
to pay $90,000 in legal fees to Jones's attorney for the expenses incurred in the taking of this
deposition. Id.
13. This denial occurred on January 26, 1998. Starr Report, supra note 1, at 251-52.
14. SCHMIDT & WEISSKOPF, supra note I, at 212.
15. She also negotiated immunity for her mother who had been implicated in the cover-up of her
affair. Id. at 41.
16. Id. She surrendered the dress to the FBI for testing on July 29, 1998. Id. at 214.
17 See Starr Report, supra note 1, at 159-61; SCHMIDT& WEISSKOPF supra note 1, at 235-38.
18. SCHMIDT & WEISSKOPF, supra note 1, at 237 The definition stated "a person engages in
sexual relations when the person knowingly engages in or causes contact with the genitalia, anus,
groin, breast, inner thigh or buttocks of any person with an intent to arouse or gratify the sexual desire
of any person." Id. at 239
19. Id.
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means is and never has been, that is not-that is one thing. If it means there is
none, that is a completely true statement. 20 When pressed further on the issue, the
President denied "trying to give ... a cute answer," but argued that "generally
speaking in the present tense, if someone said that, that would be true. And I don't
know what [the prosecutor] had in his mind. 21
The underlying facts of the impeachment hearings of President Clinton are used
to illuminate the thesis of this article: that the perjury statutes, as crafted, create
interpretive problems that defy logic and usurp the legislative purpose of the
statutes.22 Lying under oath becomes undefinable and hinders prosecutors as often
as it catches perpetrators. Because of cumbersome evidentiary requirements,
inconsistent judicial interpretation, and complex speech nuances, the statutes are
difficult to administer and are thus counterproductive.
By analyzing the perjury statutes, this article squarely confronts these problems.
Moreover, by examining how the statutes operate together, this article identifies
how intrinsically dysfunctional they are and how they tend to disserve their
intended purpose. In doing so, this article points out the added difficulty courts
have in applying these statutes to nuances of language and meaning.
Ultimately, this article reveals the inability of the existing perjury statutes to
account for the human tendencies that go along with trying to rectify a lie once it
is told. Recognizing that truth is the cornerstone of thejustice system, the perjury
statutes should not be a bar to truth-telling, but should be used to coax the truth out
of an individual, if such truth is known. Being faced with obvious exposure to the
truth is often a great motivator for getting a truthful answer-which is, and should
be, the ultimate goal. Restructuring the perjury statutes to allow an individual to
rectify the lie by telling the truth without being charged with perjury would better
serve the legislative purpose of the statutes and the goals ofjustice.
Part II of this article discusses the federal perjury statutes and describes the
different application of each statute. Part II also examines the statutes and discusses
the courts' interpretation of them. Part III applies the statutes to three hypothetical
Clinton perjury allegations. Part IV suggests how the statute might be amended to
address the legislative intent and curtail some of the problems that have perplexed
the courts and frustrated prosecutors and perpetrators alike. Part V offers
conclusions about the continued viability of the statutes.
20. Id. at 238.
21. Id. at 239.
22. The actual purpose of § 1623 was to encourage truthful testimony by witnesses appearing
before courts and grand juries. See S. REP No. 91-617, at 33, 57-59, 109-11, 149-50 (1969); H.R.
REP No. 91-1549, at 33 (1970), reprinted in 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4007, 4023-24. This was
accomplished by enacting several changes to the federal perjury statutes. Congress eliminated the two-
witness rule from § 1623 prosecutions, the requirement that a perjury conviction be obtained only upon
direct evidence, and allowed proof of perjury by proof of two contradictory statements without
requiring the proof of falsity of one. Congress balanced these enhanced prosecution tools by allowing
defendants a defense of recantation, which "serves as an inducement to the witness to give truthful
testimony by permitting him voluntarily to correct a false statement without incurring the risk [of]
prosecution by doing so." H.R. REP No. 91-1549, at 48. See also United States v. Moore, 613 F.2d
1029, 1040 (D.D.C. 1979).
Winter 20031
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II. FEDERAL PERJURY STATUTES
The trio of statutes that are used by the federal government as the basis for
charging perjury are found in Title 18 of the United States Code in §§ 1621, 1622,
and 1623.23 Section 1621 applies to material statements made under oath to "a
competent tribunal, office, or person, in any case in which a law of the United
States authorizes an oath to be administered."24 This section allows for perjury to
be charged for falsehoods made in any proceeding for which the law authorizes an
oath to be administered, and includes "ex parte proceedings and investigations as
well as ordinary adversary suits and proceedings."25 Section 1622 applies where
one person convinces another to commit "any perjury "whether it is perjury under
§ 1621 or § 1623.26 A requirement of a conviction under § 1622 is that actual
perjury must have occurred.27 Section 1623 applies to persons who commit perjury
"in any proceeding before or ancillary to any court or grand jury of the United
States."2S This section makes it an offense to knowingly make, under oath, a false
23. There are four main statutes, but this article will focus only on the main two. See 18 U.S.C.
§§ 1621, 1623 (2000). See also 18 U.S.C. § 1622 (2000) (Subornation of Perjury); 18 U.S.C. § 1001
(2000).
24. Title 18 U.S.C. § 1621, entitled "Perjury generally," provides:
Whoever-
(1) having taken an oath before a competent tribunal, officer, or person, in any case in which a
law of the United States authorizes an oath to be administered, that he will testify, declare,
depose, or certify truly, or that any written testimony, declaration, deposition, or certificate by
him subscribed, is true, willfully and contrary to such oath states or subscribes any material
matter which he does not believe to be true; or
(2) in any declaration, certificate, verification, or statement under penalty of perjury as permitted
under section 1746 of title 28, United States Code [28 U.S.C.A. § 17461, willfully subscribes
as true any material matter which he does not believe to be true;
is guilty of perjury and shall, except as otherwise provided by law, be fined under this title
or imprisoned not more than five years, or both. This section is applicable whether the
statement or subscription is made within or without the United States.
18 U.S.C. § 1621 (2000).
25. 60A AM. JUR. 2D Perjury § 39 (1989). See, e.g., United States v. Price, 2001 U.S. App.
LEXIS 9341, at *4 (9th Cir. May 8, 2001) (false statements to obtain Social Security benefits); United
States v. LaFontaine, 210 F.3d 125, 133 (2d Cir. 2000) (false statement in bail revocation hearing);
United States v. Weissman, 195 F.3d 96, 98 (2d Cir. 1999) (false statement to Senate committee);
United States v Drinkwine, 133 F.3d 203, 203 (2d Cir. 1998) (false statements at a SEC deposition);
United States v. Oakar, Ill F.3d 146, 156 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (false statement to Congress); United
States v. Allen, 892 F.2d 66, 67 (10th Cir. 1989) (false sworn financial affidavits).
26. Section 1622, entitled "Subornation of perjury," provides: "Whoever procures another to
commit any perjury is guilty of subornation of perjury, and shall be fined under this title or imprisoned
not more than five years, or both." 18 U.S.C. § 1622 (2000).
27. See generally United States v. Hairston, 46 F.3d 361 (4th Cir. 1995); United States v.
Silverman, 74. F.2d 1386 (1 th Cir. 1984).
28. Section 1623, entitled "False declarations before grand jury or court," provides:
(a) Whoever under oath ... in any proceeding before or ancillary to any court or grand jury of
the United States knowingly makes any false material declaration or makes or uses any other
information, including any book, paper, document, record, recording, or other material, knowing
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material declaration in a proceeding before or ancillary to any court or grand jury
proceeding. A statement made under oath in any proceeding less formal than a
deposition is not a proceeding ancillary to a court or grand jury 29
Perjury may be charged by the government under any single provision, or in any
actionable combination.3" Section 1623, which is generally viewed as the narrower
the same to contain any false material declaration, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned
not more than five years, or both.
(b) this section is applicable whether the conduct occurred within or without the United States.
(c) An indictment or information for violation of this section alleging that, in any proceedings
before or ancillary to any court or grand jury of the United States, the defendant under oath has
knowingly made two or more declarations, which are inconsistent to the degree that one of them
is necessarily false, need not specify which declaration is false if-
(]) each declaration was material to the point in question, and
(2) each declaration was made within the period of the statute of limitations for the
offense charged under this section.
In any prosecution under this section, the falsity of a declaration set forth in the indictment or
information shall be established sufficient for conviction by proof that the defendant while under
oath made irreconcilably contradictory declarations material to the point in question in any
proceeding before or ancillary to any court or grandjury. It shall be a defense to an indictment
or information made pursuant to the first sentence of this subsection that the defendant at the
time he made each declaration believed the declaration was true.
(d) Where, in the same continuous court or grandjury proceeding in which a declaration is made,
the person making the declaration admits such declaration to be false, such admission shall bar
prosecution under this section if, at the time the admission is made, the declaration has not
substantially affected the proceeding, or it has not become manifest that such falsity has been or
will be exposed.
(e) Proof beyond a reasonable doubt under this section is sufficient for conviction. It shall not
be necessary that such proof be made by any particular number of witnesses or by documentary
or other type of evidence.
18 U.S.C. § 1623 (2000).
29. Dunn v. United States, 442 U.S. 100, 113 (1979).
30. See United States v. Lande, 968 F.2d 907 913 (9th Cir. 1992); United States v. Cavada, 821
F.2d 1046, 1048 (5th Cir. 1987); Edwards v. United States, 814 F.2d 486, 488 (7th Cir. 1987); United
States v Ruggiero, 472 F.2d 599, 606 (2d Cir. 1973). But see United States v. Kahn, 472 F.2d 272,
282-84 (2d Cir. 1966) (holding that the argument that Congress intended to allow government absolute
prosecutorial discretion to proceed against perjurer under § 1621 or § 1623 is unsupported by the
legislative history). However, the principle allowing prosecutorial discretion was later affirmed in
United States v. Sherman, 150 F.3d 306 (3d Cir. 1998). There, in a grand jury proceeding
investigating medical malpractice, a defendant recanted his perjured testimony, but not in time. Id. at
308. The government, however, charged him under § 1621. Id. at 310. Rejecting the defendant's
contention that the government denied him of his due process rights by denying him an opportunity
to present his recantation defense, the court held that "a defendant has no constitutional right to elect
which of two applicable federal statutes shall be the basis of his indictment and prosecution." Id. at
313 (citing United States v. Ciampaglia, 628 F.2d 632, 639 (1st Cir. 1980)). See generally James
Nesland, Perjury and False Declarations, in 2 WHITE COLLAR CRIME: BUsINESS AND REGULATORY
OFFENSES § 10.01 (Otto G. Obermaier & Robert G. Marvillo eds., 2003) (describing legislative intent
of statutes).
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of the two, 3' is sometimes charged along with § 1621, the broader of the two
statutes.32
Regardless of which statute a violation is charged, the elements of perjury are the
same. Perjury requires that there be (1) an oath,33 (2) intent,34 (3) a false
statement, 35 and (4) materiality 36 However, there are differences between the two
statutes such as in the party to whom the false statement is made, the effects of
recantation, 7 the use of false materials to commit perjury,38 the effect of
inconsistent declarations, 39 and the requirement of the two-witness rule.4"
3 1. The purpose of § 1623 is to "encourage truthful testimony by witnesses appearing before
federal courts and grand juries." United States v Sherman, 150 F.3d 306, 315 (3d Cir. 1998). See also
Dunn v United States, 442 U.S. 100, 107 (1979).
32. This section is broader in scope because it covers any false statement made under oath before
a "competent tribunal, officer, or person," and notlust a court or grand jury. 18 U.S.C. § 1621(2000).
33. Under § 1621 the oath requirement is satisfied where the authority to administer the oath is
derived from an administrative rule or regulation. See Jared S. Hosid, Perjury, 39 AM. CRiM. L. REV
895, 899 (2002). Under § 1623, the requirement of the oath seems to be stricter. Id. at 898. See also
United States v. Gomes-Vigil, 929 F.2d 254, 258 (6th Cir. 1991) (violation of§ 1746, falsely made
"under penalty of perjury" sufficient to support perjury under § 1623, which requires false statement
to be "under oath"). But see United States v. Jaramillo, 69 F.3d 388, 391-93 (9th Cir. 1995) (statement
made under penalty of perjury but not under oath did not satisfy § 1623(c) perjury charge).
34. See United States v. Lighte, 782 F.2d 367 372 (2d Cir. 1986); United States v. Chaplin, 25
F.3d 1373, 1377 (7th Cir. 1994). The intent requirement under § 1621 is willfulness and knowledge
of falsity 18 U.S.C. § 1621 (2000). Under § 1623, the intent is described as knowingly stated or
subscribed. 18 U.S.C. § 1623 (2000). For a discussion of the intent differences between § 1621 and
§ 1623, see United States v. Goguen, 723 F.2d 1012 (1st Cir. 1983) and United States v. Sherman, 150
F.3d 306 (3d Cir. 1998). Thus, under § 1621, the government must prove willfulness and knowledge
beyond a reasonable doubt. See United States v. Dunnigan, 507 U.S. 87, 94 (1993); United States v
Nash, 175 F.3d 429, 436 (6th Cir. 1999). Under § 1623, the intent requirement is met if the
government can prove or infer that the speaker knew the statement was false when spoken. See United
States v, Vest, 842 F.2d 1319, 1323, 1324 (1st Cir. 1988).
35. A declaration must be false under §§ 1621 and 1623. United States v. Hvass, 355 U.S. 570,
577 (1958) (under § 1621); United States v Durham, 139 F.3d 1325, 1331 (10th Cir. 1998) (under
§ 1623). Courts are uncertain, however, on whether direct evidence of falsity is needed. See, e.g.,
Vuckson v. United States, 354 F.2d 918, 920 (9th Cir. 1966). Courts are also unclear on whether
sufficientlv compelling circumstantial evidence may suffice where falsity cannot be proved directly.
See, e.g., United States v. Sampol, 636 F.2d 621, 655 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (circumstantial evidence
permitted to support allegations of false statement). In either case, doubt about the falsity must benefit
the defendant. See United States v Moreno Morales, 815 F.2d 725, 749 n.32 (1st. Cir. 1987)
("[G]overnment did not need to prove through direct evidence that [defendant] saw the other agents.").
36. Proof of this element rests with the prosecution. See United States v Conley, 186 F.3d 7,
19 (1st Cir. 1999). A statement is said to be material if it has a natural tendency to influence the
tribunal. See United States v. Arambula, 238 F.3d 865, 868 (7th Cir. 2001).
37 Under § 1621, a witness's attempt to repudiate, correct, or otherwise cure the effect of false
testimony do not insulate him from prosecution for perjury. See generally United States v. Noms, 300
U.S. 564 (1937). Section 1623 allows for the defense of recantation if the other requirements of effect
of the false statement on the proceedings and timeliness are met. 18 U.S.C. § 1623(d) (2000).
38. Section 1621 is applicable only when a person under oath "states or subscribes to any
material matter which he does not believe to be true." 18 U.S.C. § 1621(1) (2000). However, § 1623
takes effect when a person under oath knowingly makes a false statement or "makes or uses any other
information, including any book, paper, document, record, recording, or other material.... See 18
U.S.C. § 1623(a) (2000). Despite § 1621 applying to a broader range of proceedings, it has a narrow
range of prohibited conduct.
39 Illogical as it may seem, irreconcilably inconsistent statements, one of which must be false,
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There are two parts of a dialogue to every perjury charge: the question asked and
the answer given. Courts have required near-absolute clarity from the questioner
in order to support a perjury charge.4 However, defendants have routinely escaped
perjury convictions by responding to clear questions with non-responsive, vague,
or evasive answers. Arguably, what is needed is a standard that works equally for
both the prosecution and the defense.
A. The Question and the Answer
The general federal perjury statute, § 1621, provides that whoever takes an oath
before "a competent tribunal, officer, or person" to testify truthfully but "willfully
and contrary to such oath states or subscribes any material matter which he does not
believe to be true ... is guilty of perjury 42 The objective of this statute is to aid the
search for the truth by preventing and punishing false testimony 43
1 Prosecutor s Questions
The U.S. Supreme Court has held that a charge of perjury cannot rest on a
defendant's responses to ambiguous questions." A witness is not required to
decipher an imprecise or confusing question, 4' and neither is the jury permitted to
guess at what meaning a defendant may have ascribed to such a question. 46 The
responsibility for framing the inquiry clearly and directly lies with the prosecutor 47
Nonetheless, the existence of some ambiguity in a question will not necessarily
defeat a perjury charge.48 Rather, recognizing that almost any question can be
interpreted in several ways when subjected to ingenious scrutiny after the fact,
courts have distinguished between "arguably ambiguous" questions and
"fundamentally ambiguous" questions.49 That is, even if a question may be subject
to more than one interpretation (so that a defendant's answer may be true under one
interpretation of a question but false under another), the question is only "arguably
ambiguous." Such ambiguities are not fatal to a perjury prosecution ifthejury can
cannot sustain proof of guilt in a § 1621 criminal prosecution. Section 1623, however, allows proof
of such statements to prove perjury. See United States v. Letchos, 316 F.2d 481, 484 (7th Cir. 1963)
(inconsistent statements under § 1621 insufficient proofofperjury); United States v. Nessanbaum, 205
F.2d 93, 95 (3d Cir. 1953) (§ 1621 requires independent proof of falsity of one or the other statement).
40. See Kathryn Kavanagh Baran & Rebecca 1. Ruby, Perjury, 35 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 1035, 1039-
40(1998).
41. See, e.g., Bronston v. United States, 409 U.S. 352, 362 (1973); United States v Serafini, 167
F.3d 812, 823-24 (3d Cir. 1999); United States v Farmer, 137 F.3d 1265, 1270 (10th Cir. 1998).
42. 18 U.S.C. § 1621 (2000).
43. Dunn v. United States, 442 U.S 100, 107 (1979).
44. Bronston v United States, 409 U.S. 352, 362 (1973). See also United States v Bollin, 264
F.3d 391, 411 (4th Cir. 2001) ("[P]recise questioning is imperative as a predicate for the offense of
perjury." (citing Bronston v. United States, 409 U.S. 352, 362 (1973)).
45. See United States v, Spalliero, 602 F Supp. 417, 422 (C. D. Cal. 1984).
46. United States v, Martellano, 675 F.2d 940, 946 (7th Cir. 1982).
47 United States v. Tonelli, 577 F.2d 194, 198 (3d Cir. 1978).
48. United States v. Doherty, 867 F.2d 47 69 (1st Cir. 1989).
49. Farmer 137 F.3d at 1268-69.
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make a reasoned determination of the defendant's understanding of the question. 50
In such an instance, the jury is entitled to find the defendant guilty if it determines
that, given the defendants understanding of the question, his answer was false."'
2. Fundamental Ambiguity
While the defendant's interpretation of an arguably ambiguous question is within
the province of thejury to decide, a question which is fundamentally ambiguous is
insufficient as a matter of law to support ajury indictment or conviction. 2
Fundamentally ambiguous questions are so vague or confusing that they would
invoke ajury to engage in "groundless surmise" as to the meaning of the question
and to substitute its own interpretation for that of the defendant.53 Thus, a question
is fundamentally flawed if men of average intelligence could not agree on its
meaning and it could not be used with mutual understanding without further
definition of its terms.54 Federal courts have identified and relied upon a number
of particular factors in determining whether a question is fundamentally ambiguous:
(1) the inherent vagueness--or, conversely the inherent clarity--of certain words
and phrases, (2) the compound character of a question, (3) the existence of defects
in syntax or grammar in a question, (4) the context of the question and answer, and
(5) the defendant's own responses to allegedly ambiguous questions.5
t. Inherent vagueness
Courts have found that some words or phrases are so inherently vague or subject
to differing interpretation and usage that they render a question fundamentally
ambiguous.56 On the other hand, courts have also held that some words or phrases
50. United States v. Lighte, 782 F.2d 367 375 (2d Cir. 1985).
51. United States v. Farmer, 137 F.3d 1265, 1269 (10th Cir. 1989).
52. Lighte, 782 F.2d at 375. Important policy considerations underlie the rule of fundamental
ambiguity- (1) to prevent convictions which are based on mere conjecture, and (2) to encourage
participation in judicial proceedings bv refusing to impose the risks of inartful questioning on
witnesses. Bronston, 409 U.S. at 358-59; United States v. Ryan, 828 F.2d 1010, 1015 (3d Cir. 1987).
53. Lighte, 782 F.2d at 375.
54. United States v. Lattimore, 127 F Supp. 405, 410 (D.D.C. 1955). See also Lgghte, 782 F.2d
at 375 (defining question as fundamentally ambiguous when it is not "a phrase with a meaning about
which men of ordinary intellect could agree, nor one which could be used with mutual understanding
by a questioner and answerer unless it were defined at the time it were sought and offered as
testimony" (citing Lattimore, 127 F Supp. at 410)).
55. United States v. Serafini, 7 F Supp. 2d 529, 539 (M. D. Pa. 1998).
56. For instance, in United States v. Lattimore, 127 F Supp. 405, 406 (D.D.C. 1955), the
government indicted the defendant for committing perjury before a Senate sub-committee for denying
that he was a "follower of the Communist line." The court held that this phrase had no uniform,
commonly accepted definition and that the jury would have to engage in "groundless surmise" to
determine the meaning which defendant attributed to this phrase. Id. at 409. Hence, the question was
fundamentally ambiguous and could not support a perjury conviction as a matter of law. Id. See also
United States v. Sainz, 772 F.2d 559 564 (9th Cir. 1985) (holding that a question incorporating the
word "procedure" was fatally ambiguous when used by a prosecutor during an investigation of
corruption in the Immigration and Naturalization Service because the term could refer to the entire
procedure of admitting automobiles across the border or to some individual step in that procedure);
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have such plain and common meaning that they are inherently unambiguous." Such
words should be accorded their natural and commonplace meaning,5" and the
defendant will not be permitted to twist their meaning to escape a perjury charge.59
ii. Compound questions
A compound question or a question that is subject to more than one interpretation
may be fundamentally ambiguous. If a prosecutor combines two or more discrete
inquiries in one question which elicits a single response from the witness, it may be
impossible for the jury to know which question the witness believed he was
answering.6
iii. Defects in syntax or grammar
It may be impossible for the fact-finder to determine if the witness understood the
meaning of the questions if the question is flawed by serious errors in syntax or
United States v. Wall, 371 F.2d 398, 399 (6th Cir. 1967) (holding that a question about whether a
defendant has been "on a trip" with someone was vague and was insufficient to support perjury charge
because the phrase could refer to physically traveling with someone or merely being with someone at
a particular place).
57 Serafirn, 7 F Supp. 2d at 539.
58. United States v. Nixon, 816 F.2d 1022, 1030 (5th Cir. 1987).
59. United States v. Martellano, 675 F.2d 940, 942 (7th Cir. 1982). See, e.g., United States v.
Long, 534 F.2d 1097, 1100 (3d Cir. 1976)(finding thattheterms "bribes," "kickbacks," and "payoffs"
were not legal terms of art, but were "words of common currency which form part of the vocabulary
of almost any American in his teens or older"); United States v. Kross, 14 F.3d 751, 756 (2d Cir. 1994)
(holding that question incorporating the word "ever" is not fundamentally ambiguous because the term
is not imprecise on its face).
60. United States v Landau, 737 F Supp. 778, 781-83 (S.D.N.Y 1990) (finding question
whether the witness had told certain people that "[he] had to make payments to the union or that it was
necessary because of the union's picketing that it cost you more money'?" to be fundamentally
ambiguous, in part, because it posed two separate inquiries-whetherthe payments were necessary and
whether the picketing cost more-in a form that prompted a single response). See also, United States
v. Markiewicz, 978 F.2d 786, 809 (2d Cir. 1992) (holding that question was fundamentally ambiguous
where it could have been asking about the defendants' actions in a personal capacity or her official
actions as a member of a tribal council); United States v. Tonelli, 577 F.2d 194, 199-200 (3d Cir.
1978) (questioning whether defendant "handled" certain pension funds fundamentally ambiguous
where handling could have meant touching the check or effecting the transaction, and it was the
prosecutor's responsibility to clarify which question he was asking); United States v. Eddy, 737 F.2d
564, 571 (6th Cir. 1984) (reversing conviction where question asked incorporated at least four separate
lines of inquiry). But see, United States v. Heater, 63 F.3d 311, 327 (4th Cir. 1995) (holding evidence
sufficient to support perjury conviction because question, "Have you ever bought or sold marijuana?"
"intelligible" even though compound); United States v. Chapin, 515 F.2d 1274, 1282 (D.C. Cir. 1975)
(holding that compound question, "Did you ever express any interest to [Mr. Segretti] or give [Mr.
Segretti] any directions or instructions with respect to any single or particular candidate?" not
ambiguous because both parts of question asked for same information; use of two analogous phrases
in the same question was a mere "rhetorical flourish").
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grammar." Also, the use of an unclear reference may cause a question to be fatallyambiguous. 2
tv Context
In determining whether a question is fundamentally ambiguous as a matter of
law, courts will also examine the context of the question.63 Important contextual
clues are the questions and answers that preceded or followed the question which
provoked the allegedly perjurious response and the defendant's understanding of
the overall purpose of the investigation.64
Thus, a question that appears clear when considered in isolation may be
fundamentally ambiguous in light of the broader line of questioning.63 The context
of questioning cuts both ways, however, and a defendant will not be permitted to
61. See Ryan, 828 F.2d at 1i016-17 (conviction for perjury reversed where response to a request
for "Previous Address (last five years)" on a credit card application was fundamentally ambiguous
because singular form of the noun "address" on the application could have been variously construed
as asking the applicant to supply any previous address he had within the last five years, the applicant's
most recent address, or all addresses the applicant had within the last five years); United States v.
Farmer, 137 F.3d 1265, 1270 (10th Cir. 1998) (court found the question "Have you talked to Mr.
McMahan, the defendant, about your testimony here today" ambiguous because it was unclear
whether the phrase "here today" was intended to modify the word "talked" or the word "testimony,"
thus ajury could not reasonably determine ifthe prosecutor was asking whether the witness had talked
to the defendant on the day of her testimony before the grand jury or whether she had talked with him
on some earlier occasion about the testimony she was going to give on that day). But see United States
v. Williams, 552 F.2d 226, 229 (8th Cir. 1977) (holding that, given context of inquiry, defendant
understood prosecutor's use of plural form of term "liens" to include singular term "lien" and so
evidence was sufficient to support perjury conviction).
62. See, e.g., United States v. Lighte, 782 F.2d 367, 375 (2d Cir. 1986) (reversing conviction
based on fundamental ambiguity where prosecutor used the pronoun "you" to refer to the defendant
in a series of questions but did not clarify when he was referring to the defendant in his capacity as
trustee and when he was referring to the defendant in his individual capacity); United States v. Slawik,
548 F.2d 75, 85 (3d Cir. 1977) (reversing perjury conviction because, inter alia, the questioner's
unqualified reference to "it" and "this" throughout a series of Oquestions made the questions
fundamentally ambiguous).
63. See Farmer 137 F.3d at 1269- Martellano, 675 F.2d at 943.
64. Martellano, 675 F.2d at 943; Chapin, 515 F.2d at 1280; United States v. Butt, 745 F Supp.
34, 36 (D. Mass. 1990).
65. Farmer 137 F.3d at 1269. See also United States v. Bell, 623 F.2d 1132, 1135 (5th Cir.
1980) (court dismissed defendant's perjury count that was based on defendant's negative response to
question "...do you have records that are asked for in the subpoena?" because, even though such
records existed, the prosecutor's earlier question suggested that he was interested only in records which
the defendant bought with him to the grand jury room); Tonelli, 577 F.2d at 198 (government alleged
that defendant falsely denied that he had "participated" in the placement of certain funds at a bank;
court vacated conviction emphasizing that indictment removed the question from context by omitting
the defendant's truthful response to a crucial follow-up question in which the prosecutor had
recognized that the earlier question was ambiguous and had qualified and defined his meaning of the
term "participation."); United States v. Manapat, 928 F.2d 1097 1101 ( I1th Cir. 1991) (affirmed lower
courts dismissal of perjury charges against defendant who government alleged had failed to disclose
prior, criminal and traffic convictions on a Federal Aviation Administration medical application after
concluding that the confusing configuration of questions on the form-in which questions regarding
prior convictions were placed in the middle of a sequence of questions relating to medical history-
rendered the application form ambiguous as a matter of law.)
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isolate a question from the context of the broader questioning to distort its meaning
and escape a perjury charge.66 In examining the context of a question, the court may
also consider the purpose of the overall investigation, as well as the defendant's
understanding of that purpose, because a particular question's meaning may be
manifest in light of the larger objectives of the trial or grand jury proceeding.
67
3. Defendant s Answers
t. Literal truth
In order to constitute perjury the matters sworn to must be false. 68 The truth is
always a complete defense. Perjury cannot be based upon an answer that is literally
true, even though the answer is incomplete, misleading, or non-responsive.69
In Bronston v UnitedStates, the Supreme Court was asked to determine whether
a witness may be convicted of perjury for an answer, under oath, that is literally true
but not responsive to the question asked and arguably misleading by negative
implication.7" The Court held that a person cannot be guilty of perjury who speaks
the truth, even if it is non-responsive.71 Finding that § 1621's purpose is to "keep
the course of justice free from the pollution of perjury ,72 the Court held that the
words of the statute confine the offense to one who "states" a material matter that
one does not believe to be true. The statute cannot be construed to mean what in
casual conversation might be inferred. Rather, it is to be construed only upon what
66. Marteliano, 675 F.2d at 944. See also United States v. Bonacorsa, 528 F.2d 1218, 1221 (2d
Cir. 1976) (defendant's conviction upheld on grounds that his answer, when asked from whom he had
bought the "fifth horse," followed by the question "And anybody else?" was not fundamentally
ambiguous because the preceding question and answer clearly indicated that the question referred to
the people from whom the defendant bought the horse); United States v. Boone, 951 F.2d 1526, 1535
(9th Cir. 1991) (holding that evidence was sufficient to support perjury conviction because questions
regarding "these trusts" not ambiguous in context of immediately preceding questions referring to three
specific trusts); United States v. Doherty, 867 F.2d 47, 68-69 (1st Cir. 1989) (holding that question
incorporating phrase "that exam" not fundamentally unclear because prosecutor had referred to
"captain's exam" and "written exam" only a few questions earlier); United States v Long, 697F Supp.
651, 660-61 (S.D.N.Y 1988) (holding that prosecutor's reference to "mortgage" not fundamentally
ambiguous because previous nine pages of deposition testimony revealed that defendant understood
term to refer to a specific loan).
67 Chapin, 515 F.2d at 1280. See also United States v. Williams, 536 F.2d 1202, 1206(7th Cir.
1976) (defendant argued that prosecutor's question whether the heroin dealer "remain[ed] at the house
during that day" was ambiguous because the word "day" could mean either the whole calendar day or
just the daylight hours; court held "day" not ambiguous because everyone at trial knew the purpose of
the inquiry was to determine the drug dealer's whereabouts at eight o'clock on a particular evening.)
Similarly, the court in Chapin, relied on the defendant's understanding of the grand jury's purpose of
investigating the commission of political "dirty tricks" during the 1972 presidential campaign to find
sufficient evidence that the defendant understood the terms "distribute" and "express any interest in"
question about the dissemination of campaign literature. Chapin, 515 F.2d at 1280.
68. 60A AM. JU. 2D Perjury § 9 (1988).
69. Bronston v. United States, 409 U.S. 352, 361-62 (1973).
70. Bronston, 409 U.S. at 352.
71. Id. at 356.
72. Id. at 357 (citing United States v. Williams, 341 U.S. 58, 68 (1951)).
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is spoken. 3 The Court ruled that the "burden is on the questioner to pin the witness
down to the specific object of the questioner's inquiry ""
Nor can perjury be based upon a non-responsive, and therefore ambiguous,
statement the literal truthfulness ofwhich cannot be ascertained.7" A court may also
consider the substance and manner of the defendant's responses to allegedly vague
questions, and the defendant's own use of allegedly ambiguous language, in
determining whether there was mutual understanding between the defendant and the
examiner as to the meaning of a question.76 The court may also consider whether
the defendant exhibited any hesitancy equivocation, or confusion in answering an
allegedly ambiguous question.77
B. The Two Witness Rule under Section 1621
One primary difference among § 1621, § 1622, and § 1623 lies in the standard of
proof requirements. Under § 1621 and § 1622, as in all criminal cases, the burden
73. The Supreme Court specifically rejected the government's argument that the statute be
broadly construed. The court held that it had no reason to go beyond the precise words of the statute
"to cure a testimonial mishap that could readily have been reached with a single additional question
by counsel alert-as every examiner ought to be-to the incongruity of [an] unresponsive answer."
Id. at 358.
74. Id. at 360. Accord United States v. Kehoe, 562 F.2d 65, 69 (1st Cir. 1977); Long, 697 F
Supp. 651 at 660; United States v. Hairston, 46 F.3d 361, 375 (4th Cir. 1995); United States v.
Abroms, 947 F.2d 1241, 1245 (5th Cir. 1991); United States v Reynolds, 919 F.2d 435, 437 (7th Cir.
1990); United States v Williams, 536 F.2d 1202, 1205 (7th Cir. 1976); United States v. Porter, 994
F.2d 470, 475 (8th Cir. 1993); United States v. Sainz, 772 F.2d 559, 564 (9th Cir. 1985); United States
v. Clarridge, 811 F Supp. 697 712 (D.D.C. 1992); United States v Bollin, 264 F.3d 391, 411 (4th
Cir. 2001); United States v. Eddy, 737 F.2d 564, 566 (6th Cir. 1984); United States v. Ruedlinger, 990
F Supp. 1295, 1303 (D. Kan. 1997); United States v. Shotts, 145 F.3d 1289, 1298 (1 Ith Cir. 1998);
United States v. Rendon-Marquez, 79 F Supp. 2d 1361, 1362-63 (N.D. Ga. 1999).
75. United States v. Esposito, 358 F Supp. 1032, 1033 (D. Ill. 1973); United States v. Cobert,
227 F Supp. 915,919 (S.D. Cal. 1964).
76. United States v Serafim, 7 F Supp. 2d 529, 539 (M.D. Pa. 1998). See also United States
v. Andrews, 370 F Supp. 365, 369 (D. Conn. 1974) (court refused to dismiss indictment as a matter
of law; defendant's contention that phrases "bookmaking operations" and "settling up" were vague
belied by use of the words "settle up" and "numbers" in his own testimony, and thus, he was unlikely
to have misunderstood the meaning of the term); United States v. Chapin, 515 F.2d 1274, 1280 (D.C.
Cir. 1975) (court dismissed the defendant's contention that he could have understood the word
"distribute" to refer to personal distribution of campaign material on street comers and house to house,
in part because in earlier grand jury testimony, the defendant had used the term to mean "pass on to
others.")
77 See United States v. Long, 534 F 2d 1097 1100 (3d Cir. 1976) (two defendants argued that
words "bribes," "kickbacks," and "payoffs," called for legal conclusions and were thus, confusing to
a layperson; court observed that they answered the question unequivocally and never evidenced any
confusion about the meaning of the words.); United States v. Nixon, 816 F.2d 1022, 1030 (5th Cir.
1987) (court declined to accept defendant's claim that the questions about "discussions" was
ambiguous; court relied in part on fact that defendant gave an expansive, immediate, and unqualified
answer to the question); United States v. Caucci, 635 F.2d 441, 445 (5th Cir. 1981) (finding evidence
sufficient to support perjury conviction and emphasizing that defendant who alleged that the term
"associates" was ambiguous did not ask for clarification and answered question without hesitance or
qualification).
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of proof on the government is guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. 8 However, § 1621
requires that the government meet this burden of proof by producing no fewer than
two witnesses to establish perjury
I Analysis of the Two-Witness Rule
The two-witness rule is "deeply rooted in past centuries," 9 and is designed to
prevent a defendant from being convicted on the strength of his oath versus that of
another.8 ° Under modern theory the rule "rests on society's obligation to protect
a witness 'from oppression, or annoyance by charges of having borne false
testimony "' Additionally "witnesses who are compelled to testify will [do so]
more freely if they know that they will not be subject to prosecution for perjury
simply because [another] witness may ... have a different recollection of the same
events.
82
Despite its deep roots in American jurisprudence,83 the two-witness rule was
omitted by Congress in § 1623, which allows a conviction upon the testimony of
one witness by providing that "[i]t shall not be necessary that such proof be made
by any particular number of witnesses or by documentary or other type of
evidence."84 However, in perjury prosecutions under § 1621 the two-witness rule
is used to assess the legal sufficiency of the government's evidence. 85 Under the
two-witness rule, the falsity of the allegedly perjurious testimony must be
established through either (1) the testimony of two or more witnesses, or (2) the
testimony of one witness supported by additional direct or circumstantial
corroborative evidence.86
78. 18 U.S.C. 1623(e) (2000).
79 For example, there is a Biblical reference to the requirement of two witnesses. Deuteronomy
17:6 states: "At the mouth of two witnesses or three witnesses, shall he that is worthy of death be put
to death; but at the mouth of one witness he shall not be put to death." See also JOHN HENRY
WiGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2032, at 326 n.6 (1978).
80. See United States v. Collins, 272 F.2d 650, 652 (2d Cir. 1959) (also stating that the
two-witness rule was intended to prevent ill-founded retaliatory attack upon a witness by a perjury
prosecution of no more than the contrary oath of another); United States v. Marchisio, 344 F.2d 653,
665 (2d Cir. 1965); Gebhard v. United States, 422 F.2d 281, 286 (9th Cir. 1970); Vuckson v. United
States, 354 F.2d 918, 920 (9th Cir. 1966).
81. See United States v. Goldberg, 290 F.2d 729, 733 (2d Cir. 1961) (quoting 7 JOHN HENRY
WIGMORE, EVIDENCE 276 (3d ed. 1940)). See also Vuckson v. United States, 354 F.2d 918,920 (9th
Cir. 1966) (stating that the crime of perjury is not proved in the same manner as most crimes and has
been declared, from the time of Blackstone, not capable of proof under testimony of but one witness,
because "there is then but one oath against another." (quoting United States v. Wood, 39 U.S. 430, 437
(1840)).
82. See Marchtsto, 344 F.2d at 665. See also United States v. Diggs, 560 F.2d 266, 269 (7th Cir.
1977) (the policy behind the two-witness rule is that a conviction for perjury ought not to rest on "the
fear that innocent witnesses might be unduly harassed or convicted in perjury prosecutions if a less
stringent rule were adopted") (quoting Weiler v. United States, 323 U.S. 606, 609 (1945)).
83. For a history of the law of perjury, see Richard H. Underwood, False Witness: A Lawyer s
History of the Law of Perjury, 10 ARIZ. J. INT'L & COMP L. 215 (1993).
84. 18 U.S.C. § 1623(e) (2000).
85. 18 U.S.C. § 1621 (2000).
86. United States v Meriting, 166 F.3d 923, 929 (7th Cir. 1999). See also Diggs, 560 F.2d at
269 (the rule advances important policy interests, including: (1) protecting defendants against
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The federal courts appear to be in disagreement as to whether the two-witness
rule replaces proof beyond a reasonable doubt as a prerequisite to conviction of a
crime. In Brightman v. UnitedStates,87 the court ruled that (1) while corroborating
as well as primary evidence on the issue of falsity is necessary, the evidence in its
entirety need only convince the jury beyond a reasonable doubt, and (2) the
corroboration rule is an additional requirement and not a qualification of the
reasonable doubt rule.88
In other cases, however, the two-witness rule has been considered an exception
to the reasonable doubt rule. In United States v. Nessanbaum, the court stated that
the two-witness rule is a unique exception to the general rule that proof of guilt
beyond a reasonable doubt is sufficient to sustain a conviction. 89
The Supreme Court has held that when the government seeks to prove perjury by
the use ofcircumstantial evidence allowed under the two-witness rule, two factors
are crucial to an analysis of the sufficiency of the corroborative evidence: (1) the
degree to which the evidence, iftrue, substantiates the testimony of the sole witness,
and (2) the trustworthiness of that evidence. 90 The circuits are divided, however,
in their interpretation and implementation of these guidelines. 9'
i. Inconsistent with innocence standard
A majority of courts hold that corroborative evidence is sufficient if it is
inconsistent with the defendant's innocence and is strong, clear, and compelling
enough to assure the court that the guilty verdict is solidly founded.92 A minority
of courts impose a less rigorous standard and require merely that the corroborative
conviction on the basis of the potentially unreliable or biased testimony of a single witness and
(2) fostering the search for truth by encouraging witnesses to testify without fear of prosecution based
on the oath of one witness); Marchisio, 344 F.2d at 665 ("All that is required under the rule ... is that
the evidence independent of the principal witness' testimony be sufficient to corroborate that
testimony ").
87 386 F.2d 695 (1st Cir. 1967).
88. Id. at 698. See also Diggs, 560 F.2d at 270 (pointing out that in a prosecution for perjury,
as in all criminal cases, the burden on the government is that of proving the defendant guilty beyond
a reasonable doubt; that the two-witness rule merely imposes an evidentiary minimum required to meet
this burden as a matter of law and that the rule focuses on the totality of the government's evidence in
order to assure a sufficiency necessary to fulfill its underlying policy that perjury convictions not be
based merely on an "oath against an oath."); Young v. United States, 212 F.2d 236, 241 (D.C. Cir.
1954) (ruling that fulfillment of the two-witness rule is necessary for conviction of perjury, but it is not
sufficient for conviction, since an additional requirement is that thejury could reasonably believe that
there was no reasonable doubt as to the defendant's guilt).
89 205 F.2d 93, 95 (3d Cir. 1953). See also United States v. Laughlin, 226 F Supp. 112, 114
(D.D.C. 1963) (ruling that the two-witness rule presents an exception to the general rule that evidence
which is sufficient to convince ajury of the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt is sufficient
to sustain a conviction).
90. Weiler v United States, 323 U.S. 606, 610-11 (1945).
91. At least two courts have concluded that the split of authority is more apparent than real, with
the outcome in most cases being determined largely on their particular facts. United States v. Diggs,
560 F.2d 266, 269-70 (7th Cir. 1977); United States v Weiner, 479 F.2d 923, 926 (2d Cir. 1973).
92. See United States v Forrest, 639 F.2d 1224, 1226 (5th Cir. 1981); Weiner 479 F.2d at 926;
United States v. Thompson, 379 F.2d 625, 628 (6th Cir. 1967); Doty v. United States, 261 F.2d 10,
12 (10th Cir. 1958); United States v. Neff, 212 F.2d 297 307-08 (3d Cir. 1954).
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evidence "tends" to establish guilt and that the corroborative evidence and the direct
evidence be inconsistent with the defendant's innocence.93 Regardless of which
standard is used, all courts require that the corroborative evidence be independent
of the witness with the direct testimony " "Independent" means evidence coming
from a source other than that of the direct testimony of one witness.95
Courts which adhere to the majority view often appear to interpret the
requirement that the corroborative evidence be "inconsistent with the defendant's
innocence" to mean that the evidence must be absolutely inconsistent with
innocence. Thus, the court may not uphold a perjury conviction if the corroborative
evidence admits of some plausible alternative explanation of the facts which can be
harmonized with the defendant's innocence.96
93. Diggs, 560 F.2d at 270; Brightman, 386 F.2d at 697" Arena v. United States, 226 F.2d 227,
236 (9th Cir. 1955). There is virtually no authority for the proposition that the corroborative evidence
must in itself be sufficient to support a conviction (requiring the government to effectively prove its
case twice over). United States v. Weiner, 479 F.2d 923, 927 (2d Cir. 1973). But see Neff, 212 F.2d
at 308 (holding that corroborative evidence "must be equally strong and convincing as the direct
testimony").
94. See United States v. Hiss, 185 F.2d 822, 824 (2d Cir. 1950); Neff, 212 F.2d 297 at 303;
Paternostro v United States, 311 F.2d 298,306 (5th Cir. 1962); United States v. Davis, 548 F.2d 840,
843 (9th Cir. 1977); McWhorter v. United States, 193 F.2d 982, 983 (5th Cir. 1952); Diggs, 560 F.2d
266 at 268-69- United States v. Haldeman, 559 F.2d 31, 118 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
95. See, e.g., Diggs, 560 F.2d at 270; McWhorter 193 F.2d at 983. See also United States v.
Freedman, 445 F.2d 1220, 1226 (2d Cir. 1971) (stating that circumstantial evidence in corroboration
of testimony of one witness must be such that were it standing alone it would have independent
probative value).
96. See, e.g., Thompson, 379 F.2d at 625. In that case, the direct testimony of a police major,
who interrogated the defendant, directly contradicted the defendant's claim that the major had refused
the defendant's request to call an attorney. Id. at 627 In reversing the defendant's perjury conviction,
the court concluded that the corroborative testimony of two FBI agents (who participated in the
interrogation) that they did not hear the defendant make such a request was not sufficient because it
did not obviate the possibility that the defendant made the request before or after the agents were
present. Id. at 628. See also United States v. Chestman, 903 F.2d 75 (2d Cir. 1990). In that case, a
stockbroker was convicted of committing perjury before the SEC for testifying that he had not spoken
with a certain customer before 9:49 a.m. Id. at 80. The court held that a phone message the customer
left a 8:58 a.m. was not sufficiently corroborative of testimony that the defendant talked to the
customer later in the day, and it observed that the fact that the defendant had to leave a phone message
was equally supportive of the theory that the two did not make contact before 9'49 a.m. Id. at 81. See
also United States v Paternostro, 311 F.2d at 306-07 (holding that testimony of witness who overheard
unidentified person say "[tihe Captains are getting the money" was not sufficiently corroborative of
charge that police lieutenant had falsely denied participating in or having knowledge of police
corruption because comment could have plausibly concerned the difference in the respective salaries
of captains and lieutenants); Weiner 479 F.2d at 928 (where defendant denied having met with
witnesses, witnesses' testimony that defendant met with him in New York on a certain date carrying
a plaid suitcase and papers printed in purple ink was not sufficiently corroborated by evidence that the
defendant had purchased an airline ticket two days before the alleged meeting and by defendant's co-
workers' testimony that defendant had previously received a memo printed in purple ink and
sometimes carried a plaid suitcase because the corroborative evidence was not probative of the
meeting's having occurred; nonetheless, the witness's testimony that he telephoned the defendant for
recommendation of a stockbroker was confirmed by testimony of an attorney that the witness called
him, asking for a recommendation of a stockbroker, the day after the defendant told him to expect a
call from a "friend" seeking such advice). But see United States v Salanitro, 432 F.2d 59, 60 (10th
Cir. 1970) (finding an FBI agent's testimony that he saw defendant at an airport with a third person
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In addition to being inconsistent with defendant's innocence, the corroborative
evidence must be of a quality that assures the reviewing court that the conviction
was "solidly founded."97 Evidence will not meet this criterion if it does not create
a reasonable and logical inference of the defendant's guilt.98 Further, courts have
held that corroborative evidence which required the fact-finder to engage in
speculation or conjecture in order to reach a guilty verdict is not sufficient to uphold
a perjury charge.99 Finally, the probative force of corroborative evidence may turn
on the quantity, as well as the character, of the evidence offered.'
ii. Tends to establish guilt standard
In several jurisdictions, the corroborative evidence is sufficient if it tends to
establish the defendant's guilt and, when considered together with the testimony of
the primary witness, is inconsistent with the defendant's innocence.,01 Even under
and a sheriff's testimony that he saw the third person conversing with someone who the sheriff later
identified as the defendant established that defendant's denial that he knew the third person was false).
97. United States v. Forrest, 623 F2d 1107 tll (5th Cir. 1980).
98. See Forrest, 639 F.2d at 1227 (two-witness rule not met where, to prove that defendant lied
when she denied speaking to purchaser about selling him stolen eggs, the government offered the
purchaser's testimony that the phone call occurred, testimony from one of defendant's husband's
employees that he delivered eggs to another party at the defendant's direction, and testimony of a
second employee that he delivered eggs to the purchaser at the defendant's husband's direction; while
the government's evidence might have established that defendant was involved in her husband's stolen
egg enterprise, the employees could not corroborate the purchaser's testimony that the phone call
actually occurred).
99. See, e.g., Paternostro, 311 F.2d at 298. The government relied on the corroborative
testimony of a prostitute that a uniformed officer named "Pat" solicited her for bribes after her arrest
even though she could not identify the defendant as "Pat" and police records showed that another
officer with the same name, who always worked in uniform and who admittedly participated in the
graft ring, had arrested the prostitute. Id. at 307 The court reversed the defendant's conviction
because it found that only by the "wildest conjecture, surmise, and suspicion" could thejury infer from
this evidence that the defendant had accepted the bribe. Id. at 307-08. See also Neff, 212 F.2d at 297
There, the court held that corroborative evidence that the defendant signed a nominating petition for
a Communist Party candidate, was a member of the Communist Party, and collected dues for the Party
at her workplace did not establish that she committed perjury by denying she had ever attended a
Communist Party meeting. Id. at 307 Although the evidence established that the defendant was a
member of the Party, which made it "probable" that she had attended a Party meeting, it did not "lead
directly to the inevitable ... conclusion" that the defendant had lied. Id. at 308.
100. See Forrest, 623 F.2d at I I 1. In that case, the defendant was convicted of falsely testifying
that he bought automobiles at a certain auction company. Id. at 1109. A witness testified that the
defendant told him that the company did not exist; moreover, FBI agents testified to the extensive
efforts they engaged in in establishing no such company existed. Id. at 1111 -12. The court concluded
that the "considerable amount" of unrebutted evidence satisfied the corroboration requirements of the
two-witness rule. Id.
101. United States v. Diggs, 560 F.2d 266, 270 (7th Cir. 1977). In that case, the government
prosecuted the defendant for perjury for denying that he had knowledge about a particular machine gun
or that he had delivered it to a particular person. The recipient of the gun testified that the defendant
had personally delivered it to him. Id. at 268. The prosecution offered the corroborative testimony
ofother witnesses who saw the defendant visit the recipient's house on the date of the delivery and saw
the weapon in the recipient's home after the defendant left, although they did not see him actually make
the delivery. Id. In upholding the conviction, the court held that the totality of the evidence, which
consisted of the direct testimony of the recipient and the independent corroborative testimony of the
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this standard, however, the court will not uphold a perjury conviction if the
corroborative evidence does not give rise to a reasonable inference of the
defendant's guilt. 102
While this conflict in standards has been noted by the courts, it is generally
agreed that the difference, if any is mainly in emphasis and semantics. 1 3 It is not
thought to render a difference in results. However, an examination of the cases
decided under the tests reveals a difference in results that is attributable to the tests.
Further, this difference in treatment would be abated if the two-witness rule was not
mandated under § 1621, but rather, the jury was left to decide the sufficiency of the
government's evidence. Proof of this conclusion lies in the fact that under other
rules applicable in perjury cases, the two-witness rule does not act as a bar to
conviction.
C. Section 1623(c)-Inconsistent Statements
Section 1623(c), governing inconsistent declarations under oath, provides that the
defendant may be convicted of making false declarations if he has made two
three witnesses, was sufficient to satisfy the requirements of the two-witness rule. Id. at 270. See also
Brightman v United States, 386 F.2d 695, 695 (1st Cir. 1967). There the defendant was convicted of
falsely testifying in a bankruptcy proceeding that monies from the sale of certain corporate property
were paid to employees who prepared the property for shipment to buyers. Id. at 696. The employees'
direct testimony that they were never paid was corroborated by the testimony of a foreman that the
employees had been laid off before the sale and the testimony of a "phalanx" of purchasers that they
prepared the equipment themselves. Id. at 696-97 The court emphasized that it could be "reasonably
inferred" from the "total evidence" that the employees were not on the payroll at the time of the sale,
and thus, they could not have been paid by the defendant. Id. at 698. But see United States v. Chaplin,
25 F.3d 1373, 1380-81 (7th Cir. 1994) (two-witness rule not met where defendant stated in a
bankruptcy proceeding that he did not recall giving $8,000 to his father-in-law on a specific date in
October, although father-in-law testified defendant "probably gave him money" sometime in October
and a deposit slip for father-in-law's account showed an $8,000 deposit on the specified date, because
evidence did not establish that the father-in-law received money on that date; however, two-witness
rule was met on defendant's denial that he placed items in father-in-law's garage where father-in-law
testified that defendant did so and another witness testified to seeing items in the garage, labeled with
the defendant's name).
102. See United States v Howard, 445 F.2d 821, 822 (9th Cir. 1971). In that case, the defendant
was convicted of falsely stating that he used bogus identification to rent a car. Id. at 822. The rental
car agent testified that the defendant's companion rented the car and produced the false identification.
A police officer, who pulled over the defendant and his companion several days after the rental
transaction, testified that the companion produced the identification card used to rent the car. Id. at
822-23. An FBI agent also testified that the defendant later claimed that he actually bought the car,
which he believed was "hot," and later found the rental invoice in the glove compartment. Id. at 823.
The court concluded that the police officer's testimony failed to establish an inference that the
defendant did not possess the false identification when he rented the car because the defendant could
easily have used the identification during the rental transaction and later given it to his accomplice.
Similarly, the FBI agent's testimony as to the defendant's claim to have purchased the car tended to
show only the defendant's consciousness of guilt. This guilt would be equally consistent with rental
and conversion of the car or with his aiding an accomplice in the theft of the car. Id.
103. See United States v Weiner, 479 F.2d 923, 927 (2d Cir. 1973) (stating that "an examination
of the facts ... of the cases ... discloses that is they differ at all, the divergencies are very few and very
narrow"); Diggs, 560 F.2d at 269-70 (expressly agreeing with the Second Circuit's conclusion that the
division "judged by its results, appears to be a matter of semantics and a slight difference in
emphasis").
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irreconcilably contradictory declarations such that one of them is necessarily
false."4 The government need not prove which of the declarations was false
through extrinsic evidence, but rather falsity of one of two declarations is inferred
from their inconsistency with each other. 5 In addition, any recantation made by
a defendant respecting his testimony is not a bar to prosecution for perjury based
on defendant's inconsistent statements.1
0 6
D. Recantation as a Defense
Section 1623(d) bars a prosecution for perjury where the defendant recants his
false statement.0 7 The central purpose of § 1623 was to encourage truthful
testimony before the courts and grand juries ' Congressional intent was to lift the
common-law rules of evidence that burdened perjury prosecutions and increase the
chance of convictions while adding a recantation provision allowing witnesses to
retract false declarations without inviting a perjury prosecution under § 1623.1°'
The effect of § 1623(d) recantation is not to erase the lie, but rather to erect a bar
to prosecution where the statutory requirements have been met.°"0
Courts are unanimous that the recantation defense is a matter of law to be
decided, prior to trial, by the court."' However, courts do not agree as to who bears
the burden of proof to establish the recantation defense or what that burden is. The
Ninth Circuit has held that the burden rests with the prosecution to "prove the
inapplicability of this defense beyond a reasonable doubt.,,"i2 However, the Fifth
and D.C. Circuits have held that "the defendant must show that he is within an
exception""' by a preponderance of the evidence." 4 This is less problematic than
104. See United States v. Jaramillo, 69 F.3d 388, 390 (9th Cir. 1995); United States v. Monel, 201
F Supp. 2d 952, 956 (S.D. Iowa 2001) ("[A] statement other than one made under oath, such as a
sworn affidavit, can constitute one of the statements involved" in a perjury prosecution under
§ 1623(c)).
105. See United States v. Dunn, 577 F.2d 119, 122 (10th Cir. 1978). See also Dunn v. United
States, 442 U.S. 100, 104 (1979); United States v. Flowers, 813 F.2d 1320, 1324 (4th Cir. 1987).
106. See United States v McAfee, 8 F.3d 1010, 1017 (5th Cir. 1993) (recantation is not adefense
to an action brought under the "willful perjury" statute (§ 1621)). But see United States v. Scavola,
766 F.2d 37 45 (1st Cir. 1985); Unites States v. Moore, 613 F.2d 1029, 1039 (D.D.C. 1979).
107 McAfee, 8 F.3d at 1016.
108. Moore, 613 F.2d at 1040; United States v. Sebaggala, 256 F.3d 59, 64 (1st Cir. 2001)
(quoting Moore, 613 F.2d at 1040) (stating that the "core purpose of the recantation provision is to
encourage truthful testimony").
109. See 60A AM. JUR. 2D Perjury, § 107
110. See United States v. Goguen, 723 F.2d 1012, 1017 (1 st Cir. 1983); United States v. D'Auria,
672 F.2d 1085, 1093 (2d Cir. 1982); United States v. Parr, 516 F.2d 458, 472 (5th Cir. 1975); United
States v. Kahn, 472 F.2d 272, 283 (2d Cir. 1973).
111. See, e.g., Kahn, 472 F.2d at 285. See also United States v. Denison, 663 F.2d 611, 618 (5th
Cir. 1981) ("[T]he defense of recantation must be raised before trial under Federal Rule of Criminal
Procedure Rule 12(b)(2) as ajurisdictional bar to prosecution.... [Once rejected, the recantation issue
may not be raised at trial and argued to the jury.").
112. See, e.g., United States v Guess, 629 F.2d 573, 577 n.4 (9th Cir. 1980); United States v.
Tobias, 863 F.2d 685, 688 (9th Cir. 1988).
113. See, e.g., United States v. Scrimgeour, 636 F.2d 1019, 1024 (5th Cir. 1981); Moore, 613 F.2d
at 1044-45.
114. See Scrirngeour 636 F.2d at 1024 (rejecting the defendant's offer of proof that he did not
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it may seem because, as is shown, regardless of who carried the burden, recantation
has never worked as a defense.
To avoid a perjury prosecution, a witness must comply with the requirements of
the statute and declare the falsity of the statement (1) during the same proceeding
and before it "substantially affects" the proceeding, or (2) before it becomes
manifest that the defendant's falsity will be exposed."i' While the statute
specifically uses the word "or," implying that recantation can occur by meeting one
prong and not the other, courts have held that the "or" in this statute is to be
construed as meaning "and," so that "[r]ecantation can only be a defense to a
perjury charge if the prior false statement has not yet substantially affected the
proceeding and it has not become clear to the defendant that such falsity has been
or will be exposed."'"6 Even where the court finds that the defendant's statement
has occurred in the same proceeding,"' t defendants do not typically satisfy the
requirement that the subsequent statement actually recants the previous one, or they
fail to recant before it becomes manifest that the falsehood is exposed.
know that his lies had been or would be exposed to the government, reversing the district court's
findings, implying a preponderance of the evidence standard for use by the defendant); Moore, 613
F.2d at 1044 (stating that in criminal prosecutions the burden is on the government to prove beyond
a reasonable doubt every essential element of the offense it charges; however, if the statute sets forth
an exception, the burden is on the accused to bring himself within the exception, thus allowing for an
implication that the court would impose a lesser burden of proof upon the defendant). See also United
States v. Awadallah, 202 F Supp. 2d 17, 37 (2002) ("Even assuming the government has the burden
of proving, by a fair preponderance of the evidence, that the recantation defense has not been met
.... ) (emphasis added)).
115. 18 U.S.C. § 1623(d) (2000).
116. 60 AM. JUR. 2D Perjury § 109 (1980). See also McMahon v United States, 2000 WL
1869451, at *2 n.2 (10th Cir.2000) (finding, without deciding the issue, that a majority of circuits that
have considered the question hold same); Kahn, 472 F.2d at 284; United States v. Crandall, 363 F
Supp. 648, 654 (W.D. Pa. 1973). AccordScrtmgeour 636 F.2d at 1019 (explaining that a conjunctive
reading of 1623(d) comports with accepted principles of statutory construction and is supported by the
underlying congressional intent; determining that Congress did not intend to allow a perjurer to avoid
prosecution by merely recanting before his perjury adversely affects a grand jury proceeding but even
after his perjury has already been exposed.); United States v. Swainson, 548 F.2d 657, 663 (6th Cir.
1977); Moore, 613 F.2d at 1040 (ruling that while "or" is normally to be read in the disjunctive, and
while criminal statutes are to be strictly construed, Congress did not intend 1623(d) to countenance
the flagrant injustice that would result if a witness were permitted to lie to ajudicial tribunal and then,
only upon learning that he had been discovered, recant in order to bar prosecution); United States v.
Fornaro, 894 F.2d 508, 511 (2d Cir. 1990) (holding recantation effective only if false statement has
not substantially affected proceeding and if it has not become manifest that falsity has been or will be
exposed); United States v. Lewis, 876 F Supp. 308, 310-11 (D. Mass. 1994); United States v.
Sherman, 150 F.3d 306, 317 (3d Cir. 1998). But see United States v. Smith, 35 F.3d 344, 345-47(8th
Cir. 1994) (term "or" could not be construed, consistent with rule of lenity, to mean "and;"
accordingly, defendant could invoke defense either by showing that, at the time of admission,
declaration had not substantially affected the proceeding, or by showing that it had not become
manifest that declaration's falsity had been or would be exposed).
117. Crandall, 363 F Supp. at 655 (admitting that this requirement was met where the defendant
gave his statement admitting of the falsity of his earlier testimony where, although the grand jury had
been dismissed, they were subject to recall; however, defendant did not meet element of recantation
where exposure of the falsity of his statement had become manifest to him before he gave his written
statement).
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Consequently, no reported case has ever found either of these two elements
satisfied. Thus, no defendant has ever successfully pleaded this defense.'
I Sufficiency of Admissions of Falsehood
The recantation defense to false declarations before a grand jury or court requires
explicit admission that prior testimony was false; it does not require the fact-finder
to be "dragged through the lowly process of bargaining with a witness for the
truth."" 9 Admissions of falsehood are not sufficient to bar prosecution for perjury
where the defendant admits to lying, not as an act of contrition or out of a desire to
tell the truth, but as the basis for a plea bargain. 2 This is also the case where the
defendant offers only to "add to and clarify" his testimony 21 or return to "answer
any questions" the grand jury might have,' 22 or where the defendant's subsequent
statement is just inconsistent with, but does not declare the falsity of, his earlier
118. The court in United States v. Awadallah, 202 F Supp. 2d 17, 38 (S.D.N.Y 2002) staled that
the recantation defense appears to be "an illusion-often asserted but never found." The court noted
that it is not difficult to understand this result given the courts' broad interpretation of the terms
"admits to be false" and "manifest." Id. at 39. The court opined:
[A] defendant must seemingly incriminate himself by admitting that he intentionally made a false
statement (i.e., committed perjury) and then pray that a court will find that the falsity of his
previous statement was not already manifest. This iiterpretation, ii effect, nullifies the statute
because, to invoke the defense, a defendant must forfeit his Fifth Amendment right against
compulsory self-incrimination. This, in turn, ignores the canon of statutory construction under
which courts must generally interpret statutes to avoid constitutional problems.
Id. The court noted that it is nonetheless bound by precedent and the defendant's recantation defense
was rejected. Id.
119. Precision Window Mfg., Inc. v. NLRB, 963 F.2d 1105, 1110 (8th Cir. 1992). See also
United States v. Tobias, 863 F.2d 685, 688-89 (9th Cir. 1988).
120. United States v. Del Toro, 513 F.2d 656, 666 (2d Cir. 1975) (holding that confession did not
amount to recantation where defendant gave perjurious testimony to the grand jury and then went to
the United States Attorney where he agreed to cooperate and changed his story as to the events he had
testified to; court held this was hardly the type of recantation considered by Congress); United States
v. Scivola, 766 F.2d 37 45-46 (Ist Cir. 1985) (holding that a plea of guilty after learnig that the
prosecution is about to introduce tape recordings tending to prove his involvement in the original crime
is not recantation).
121. United States v. D'Auria, 672 F.2d 1085, 1092-93 (2d Cir. 1982) (holding that defendant's
counsel's statement that his client wished an opportunity to add to and clarify his testimony, that he
had not understood certain questions, and that he wished to come forward with whatever additional
information he could provide did not constitute an outright retraction; noting that defendant did not
go so far as to say he wished to change his testimony).
122. See United States v. Slawik, 408 F Supp. 190, 211-12 (D. Del. 1975) (holding that
recantation did not occur where defendant merely offered to return to subsequent grand jury to answer
any questions it might have about prior grand jury testimony).
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one. 23 Additionally, admissions of "mistakes" in grand jury testimony124 or of
failure to specifically recant'25 do not satisfy the statute as a matter of law 126
2. Substantial Affect on the Proceeding
The recantation defense requires that the witness recant before "substantially
affect[ing] the proceedings."' 27 Substantial effect includes the impact of falsehoods
on a grand jury which prohibited it from bringing an indictment where it otherwise
would have, 28 the passage of time,2 9 or where the grand jury has already acted on
the false testimony given to It130
3. Manifestness
The second element is that it cannot be manifest that the witness's falsity had
been, or would be, exposed. 3 ' Because courts apply a "had or would be" standard,
123, See Umted States v. Krough, 366 F Supp. 1255, 1256 (D.D.C. 1973) (holding affidavit given
to government did not admit of falsehoods but, rather, made statements that were inconsistent with this
earlier testimony); United States v. Goguen, 723 F.2d 1012, 1017-18 (st Cir. 1983)(holding that for
an effective recantation, the accused must come forward and explain unambiguously and specifically
which of his answers in his prior testimony was false and in what respects they were false).
124. United States v. Goguen, 723 F.2d at 1017-18 (holding that statements to agent that he might
have been "mistaken" about some ofhis answers to questions from grand jurors ineffective recantation;
to be effective, accused must come forward and explain unambiguously and specifically which of his
answers and prior testimony were false and in what respects they were false).
125. Awadallah, 202 F Supp. 2d at 36-39 (holding that failure to recant statement that he did not
know the name of individual in college exercise book was required by statute and failure to do that was
not recantation under § 1623).
126. Id. The court in Awadallah noted that recantation is a complete defense only when the
defendant admits that his allegation was "false." Id. at 37 Holding that the defense can only be
invoked if the defendant unequivocally admits that his allegedly perjurious statements were false, the
court found that the defendant contended that he was "confused" or "forgot," or that the photocopies
were not clear, but did not admit that his testimony was "false." Id. The question of whether he
"forgot" or was "confused" was a question of fact for the jury to decide. Id. The only question the
court had to decide, as a matter of law, was whether the defendant made a timely recantation by
"admit[ting] [that his] declaration [was] false." Id. at 38. It held that he did not. Id.
127 18 U.S.C. § 1623(d) (2000).
128. United States v Tucker, 495 F Supp. 607, 612-13 (E.D.N.Y 1980) (holding that false
testimony prevented grand jury from indicting business partner because of denial by witness that he
had met with business partner; court found that before defendant could return to the grand jury to
recant, prosecutors had dropped case against business partner, granted him immunity for his testimony
against the defendant; court also noted that 1623 does not require court to delve into the minds of the
prosecutor to determine why it made decisions it did concerning charges).
129. United States v. Crandall, 363 F Supp. 648, 655 (W.D. Pa 1973) (holding that defendant
did not decide to recant for two months after his false testimony deprived the grandjury of hearing and
considering competent evidence of the defendant's and another's guilt; that had defendant recanted
earlier, perhaps not much harm would have been done, however, since he chose to wait two months
to recant, he cannot be heard to argue no substantial effect on the grand jury).
130. Krough, 366 F Supp. at 1256 (holding that testimony about Watergate break-in that jury
acted upon precluded, as a matter of law, a finding that there was no substantial effect on the
proceedings).
131. 18 U.S.C. § 1623(d) (2000).
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it is nearly impossible for the defendant to survive this prong. For example, courts
have held that whether exposure manifests not only applies to whether the
inevitable exposure manifests to the defendant, but also to the prosecution.
3 2
Courts consistently hold that the "not made manifest" element applies to the
witness's knowledge that his falsehood is, or would be, exposed,'33 and that it is his
awareness that his falsehood has been revealed that terminates the availability of the
recantation defense.
34
III. APPLICATION OF THE FEDERAL PERJURY STATUTES TO SPECIFIC
ALLEGATIONS
Returning to the original scenario involving President Clinton and Ms. Lewinsky
will help illustrate the difficulty of applying the perjury statutes. For the purpose
of this illustration, assume the following statements to be the government's
allegations: 3 '
(I) When, in his interrogatory filed in the Paula Jones case, President Clinton denied
that he had sexual relations with any employee of the federal government while
he was President, he committed perjury under § 1621, in that his interrogatory
was made under oath and contained a false statement.
(2) When President Clinton stated in his deposition in the Paula Jones case that Ms.
Lewinsky's affidavit was "absolutely true," he committed perjury under
§ 1623(a), in that he lied in a qualifying proceeding about a material matter.
(3) When President Clinton stated in his grand jury testimony that he "engaged in
conduct that was improper," admitting to oral sex with Ms. Lewinsky "'3 6 (after
denying, in the Paula Jones deposition, that he engaged in sexual relations with
her), he committed perjury under § 1623(c) by making inconsistent statements in
two qualifying proceedings.
37
132. United States v. Kahn, 472 F.2d 272, 288 (2d Cir. 1973) (holding that by the time the
defendant returned to the grand jury where he recanted, the prosecution had already received testimony
from the mayor and council members where they admitted to accepting the bribes that the defendant
denied giving in his prior testimony).
133. Courts consider not only what the defendant knows, but what the defendant's attorney was
presented by the prosecution in determining what is manifest. United States v. Lewis, 876 F Supp.
308, 311 (D. Mass. 1994). See also Tucker 495 F Supp. at 612; United States v. Mazzei, 400 F
Supp. 17 19 (W.D. Pa. 1975). This would seem to preclude a defendant from ever recanting where
his lawyer was told before trial of the evidence the prosecution held against him.
134. See generally Tucker 495 F Supp. at 607, Crandall, 363 F Supp. at 648; Mazzet, 400 F
Supp. at 17 United States v. Scrimgeour, 636 F 2d 1019 (5th Cir, 1981); United States v. Denison,
663 F.2d 611 (5th Cir. 1981); United States v. Swainson, 548 F.2d 657 (6th Cir. 1977); United States
v Moore, 613 F.2d 1029 (D.C. Cir. 1979); United States v. Mitchell, 397 F Supp. 166 (D.C. Cir.
1974).
135. There were other points about which Clinton testified that prosecutors could have alleged
were perjurious. These three hypothetical allegations are not meant to indicate that they could not have
pursued other avenues. See SCHMIDT & WEISSKOPF, supra note 1, at 240.
136. It is clear that he was admitting to acts of oral sex with Ms. Lewinsky. The FBI report had
identified the semen found on her dress as matching President Clinton's. Id. at 226. This information
was passed on to President Clinton's lawyers before his grand jury testimony. Id. at 168-69.
137 When Ms. Lewinsky signed an affidavit she knew to be false she perjured herself under
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A. Allegation One
In the interrogatory filed in the Paula Jones case, Clinton answered "[n]one"
when asked to name any federal employees with whom he had had sexual relations
while President.138 The definition of sexual relations provided by the government
stated "a person engages in sexual relations when the person knowingly engages in
or causes contact with the genitalia, anus, groin, breast, inner thigh or buttocks of
any person with an intent to arouse or gratify the sexual desire of any person.' ' 3 9
In the two parts of the dialogue that are examined-the question and the
answer-the answer "none" is clear Applying the seminal case of Bronston,1' if
the question asked is answered truthfully, there is no perjury The government's
definition of sexual relations allows Clinton to argue that the question was clear and
the answer was clear. According to their own definition, he did not "knowingly
engage in or cause contact with the genitalia, anus, groin, breast, inner thigh, or
buttocks" of Ms. Lewinsky Rather, she engaged in or caused contact with him.
Therefore, under the clear question analysis, his answer was literally true, thus not
perjurious.
If the question is read as ambiguous, whom should the ambiguity benefit?
Assuming that the government had charged Clinton with perjury under § 1621(a)
for lying about his relationship with Ms. Lewinsky based on his denial in the
interrogatory, they would have been faced with Clinton's explanation of his
understanding of the question he was answering. Clinton's explanation was that he
understood the definition to exclude oral sex if it was performed on the deponent
(him).' 4' In fact, Clinton admitted that if he had touched or fondled her that would
have been included in the definition.'42 Under the case law, the benefit would go
to the answerer, because a witness is not required to decipher an imprecise or
confusing question.'43
Here, the question is clear enough, but the definition provided creates an
ambiguity Case law holds that the responsibility for framing the inquiry clearly lies
with the prosecutor. 14 Applying the law concerning ambiguous questions found in
former cases, Clinton would have a good argument that if the government was
asking him to name any federal employee with whom he had ever had sexual
relations with while he was President, their own definition of sexual relations
§ 1621. When the President urged Ms. Lewinsky to sign an affidavit she described as false, alleging
"that there is absolutely no sex of any kind in any manner, shape or form with the president" he was
suborning perjury under § 1622. For simplicity's sake, however, this article will focus only on the
perjury possibly committed by the president.
138. Starr Report, supra note 1, at 10.
139 SCHMIDT & WEISSKOPF, supra note 1, at 239.
140. Bronston v United States, 409 U.S. 352 (1973).
141. SCHMIDT & WEISSKOPF supra note i, at 239.
142. When asked whether that had happened, he answered that in his recollection, he "did not have
sexual relations with Ms. Lewinskv" Id. at 240.
143. See United States v. Spalliero, 602 F Supp. 417 419-20 (C.D. Cal 1984).
144. See United States v. Tonelli, 577 F.2d 194, 198 (3d Cir. 1978).
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allowed him to give the literally true answer of "none." Thus, Clinton did not
commit perjury under § 162 1(a) when answering the interrogatory
B. Allegation Two
If the government sought to pursue perjury charges against Clinton under
§ 1623(a) for his statement made in the Paula Jones deposition that Ms. Lewinsky's
affidavit was "absolutely true,"'45 the analysis would center around whether he
"[made] or use[d] any other information knowing the same to contain any false
material declaration.... ' ' 46 Here, the scrutiny would be upon the words of the
affidavit, and the interpretation given to them. 47  Clinton's explanation for
affirming the truthfulness of the affidavit is that the words, written in the present
tense, are true; that is, he is not having sexual relations with Ms. Lewinsky He
admitted that their relationship had been over for several months, 4 ' so when he was
asked to affirm her affidavit, and at the time she made it, it was true. At that time,
there was no sexual relationship between them.
Again, the same defense-for the same reason-would defeat the prosecution.




When Clinton gave his grand jury testimony, admitting that he engaged in
conduct that was improper, was he committing perjury by making two inconsistent
statements in violation of § 1623(c)? His first statement was that he did not engage
in sexual relations, as it was defined by the government, with any employee while
he was President. He made that statement in his interrogatory He also affirmed
Ms. Lewinsky's statement that "there is absolutely no sex of any kind" occurring
between them in his Paula Jones deposition. He also said that he had engaged in
"improper conduct" in that Ms. Lewinsky had performed oral sex on him. That
statement was made in his grand jury appearance.
Under § 1623(c), the government can charge perjury where it can show the
defendant has made, under oath, two or more material declarations which are
inconsistent to the degree that one of them is necessarily false.'49 While the
government does not have to prove which one was false, it does have to establish
that they are irreconcilably inconsistent. If Clinton s argument that he did not
engage in sexual relations with Ms. Lewinsky because she performed oral sex on
145. Starr Report, supra note I, at 10. This was in response to a question posed by Clinton's own
attorney as to whether Ms. Lewinsky's statement in her affidavit, denying a sexual relationship with
President Clinton was true. Id.
146. 18 U.S.C. § 1623(a) (2000).
147. The specific words were "that there is absolutely no sex of any kind in any manner, shape,
or form with [the] president." SCHMIDT & WEISSKOPF, supra note 1, at 238.
148. Id. at 239-41.
149. 18 U.S.C. § 1623(c) (2000).
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him, and not him on her, is valid, then his statement that he engaged in improper
conduct is not inconsistent. He never denied that she had performed oral sex on
him; he denied that he had sex with her Clinton did not say that they had never had
a relationship; rather, he denied that there was one currently In fact, prior to his
"improper conduct" statement in his grand jury testimony, there is no statement
from Clinton describing his conduct at all, only hers. There are not two statements
about the same thing here, only one statement about Lewinsky's conduct and one
statement about his. The statements that Clinton made do not contradict at all and,
therefore, do not need to be reconciled. Hence, there are no inconsistent statements
and the government could not prevail.
2. Recantation
Under the statute, even if Clinton wanted to recant his denial concerning his
relationship with Ms. Lewinsky, he could not recant during his grand jury
testimony Under § 1623(d), a defendant can recant if "in the same continuous
court or grand jury proceeding in which a declaration is made, the person making
the declaration admits such declaration to be false" if, "at the time the admission is
made, .. it has not become manifest that such falsity has been or will be
exposed."'5 0  Once the prosecutors told Clinton's counsel that they had Ms.
Lewinsky's dress and that the semen found on the dress implicated Clinton, which
they did before his testimony began, he was precluded as a matter of law from
effectively recanting."' As a matter of law, any admission had become manifest.
Consequently, Clinton had no choice but to "stay[] on [his] former statement about
that."'52
IV WHAT'S WRONG WITH THE STATUTES?
A. The Tricky Recantation Defense-§ 1623(d)
The defense of recantation is problematic under the current statutory scheme.
The tension created between § 1621 and § 1623 creates a catch-22 for the
defendant. The reason for this tension may perhaps be explained by looking at the
policy of both. Section 1621 requires a witness to testify truthfully at all times, and
subjects him to punishment for perjury if he willfully falsifies his testimony
without regard for any change of heart by the witness, on the theory that to do
otherwise is to encourage false swearing. Under § 1621, once the false statement
is uttered, the crime is complete.'
150. 18 U.S.C. § 1623(d) (2000).
151. This is because the court has ruled that whatever the attorney knows, the defendant knows
as well. See United States v Lewis, 876F Supp. 308, 310-11 (D. Mass. 1994).
152. SCHMIDT & WEISSKOPF supra note 1, at 240.
153. Although the element of wilfulness may be a matter for thejury's decision, some courts hold
that once this element is shown, the offense is complete at that time, and nothing the witness may do
thereafter can alter this fact. See United States v Norris, 300 U.S. 564, 674 (1937) ("Deliberate
material falsification under oath constitutes the crime of perjury and the crime is complete when the
witness's statement has onece been made."). Other courts have held that though a witness may have
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The goal of § 1623, however, is different. It is important that the court know the
truth and, as a means to achieving this end, it encourages one who knowingly
testifies falsely to come forward with the truth, so that justice may be done. By
employing a "knowingly" standard, rather than using § 1621 's "willful" standard,
Congress intended to lessen the burden on prosecutors to obtain a conviction. ' On
the other hand, Congress also intended to increase the chance that truthful testimony
would be offered by providing the recantation defense.'" However, with the strict
limitations imposed in § 1623(d), namely, that the recantation must occur in the
same proceeding, before the false statement has substantially affected the
proceeding, and before it has become manifest that the falsity has been or will be
exposed, it would seem that the opportunity to recant is non-existent.
The defense of recantation is illusory for two reasons. First, as the court stated
in Awadullah,"' there is no reported case in which the defense has been
successfully raised. It seems as if the requirements needed to take advantage of that
defense are insurmountable and Congress has failed in its attempt to allow for the
truth to be told without penalty albeit belatedly Second, the defense, even if it has
been successfully raised, does not bar a § 1621 prosecution.' 57 If the defendant
makes a false statement in a § 1623 proceeding, he can be immediately charged
under § 1621 because discretion rests with the prosecution."'
Two things need to happen in order for recantation to have its intended effect.
First, the government should have to "show its hand" to a defendant from whom
they are about to take sworn testimony in a grand jury or court proceeding. '59
Congress's intent in exacting § 1623 was to improve truth-telling in judicial
proceedings. 60 It further intended the statute to apply pressure calculated to induce
the witness to speak the truth at all times.1" ' Courts have recognized that
"maximum deterrence of perjury is necessarily inconsistent with maximum range
for recantation."' 6 2 However, the maximum deterrence of perjury is to compel
truthfulness from the beginning. Of what benefit is it to give a defendant the
intended to deliver false testimony, his subsequent retraction or correction may be sufficient to absolve
him from having committed perjury or from having sworn falsely. See United States v Lighte, 782
F.2d 367, 372-73 (2d Cir. 1986) (holding that for a false statement to have been made "knowingly"
under § 1623, the declarant must not have made it "by mistake or inadvertence"). In any event, it
should not be on the defendant to take his chances with the charges against him.
154. This is also evidenced by the removal ofthe two-witness rule from § 1623 prosecutions. See
18 U.S.C. § 1623 (2000).
155. See S. REP No. 91-617 at 150 (1969) ("1623(d) serves as an inducement ... to give truthful
testimony by permitting him voluntarily to correct a false statement without incurring the risk [of]
prosecution [sic] by doing so.").
156. United States v. Awadallah, 202 F Supp. 2d 17 37 (S.D.N.Y 2002).
157 Section 1621 does not permit a recantation defense. See, e.g., United States v Norris, 300
U.S. 564, 574 (1937).
158. See, e.g., United States v Swainson, 548 F.2d 657, 663 (6th Cir. 1977); United States v. Del
Toro, 513 F.2d 656, 666 (2d Cir. 1975).
159. See United States v Denison, 663 F.2d 611, 618 (5th Cir. 1981) (holding that no right of
recantation exists that would prohibit the prosecutor from immediately telling defendant of evidence
of perjury.)
160. See S. REP No. 91-617 at 57-59 (1969).
161. See id.
162. United States v Moore, 613 F.2d 1029, 1041 (D.C. Cir. 1979).
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opportunity to lie when the government knows absolutely that it cannot succeed?'63
By telling the defendant directly what information it has against him, the defendant
knows that any false statement knowingly given will result in perjury charges under
§ 1623. If the truth is what the government is after, this is one way to insure it.
164
Second, the government should not be given the discretion to charge a defendant
under § 1621 for a false statement-made in violation of § 1623. Congressional
intent is thwarted every time a defendant is charged under both, or under § 1621
when the violation occurs under § 1623 Currently, while nothing statutorily
precludes the government from charging both, the court in United States v Kahn
was correct in stating that a § 1621 charge for a § 1623 violation strips the
defendant of his right to present a recantation defense. 165 Where a defendant wants
to assert that as a matter of law, he is precluded from doing so under § 1621.166
Since the courts have rejected the unfairness argument posited by defendants in the
past, Congress should act to amend the statute in order to remove this discretion.
V CONCLUSION
President Clinton settled his legal battles with the Offices of the Independent
Counsel in January 2001, shortly before leaving office. His agreement guaranteed
that he would escape an indictment in exchange for admitting that certain of [his]
responses to questions about Ms. Lewinsky were false" (without ever admitting
which statements those were).' 67 Clinton stated that he "tried to walk a fine line
between acting lawfully and testifying falsely but now [] recognize[s] that [he] did
not fully accomplish this goal...."' 68
In enacting the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Congress attempted to
clarify the obligations of both prosecutors and defendants in a perjury prosecution.
Through judicial interpretations, prosecutorial maneuvering, and defendant
manipulation, the law of perjury has developed into a maze-like path that thwarts
a prosecutor's efforts to obtain truth and a defendant's ability to tell it.
Congressional mandate should be followed and truth-telling encouraged. Removing
the barriers to this end should be the goal of all parties.
163. Denison, 663 F.2d at 616.
164. See United States v. Beasley, 809 F.2d 1273, 1280 (7th Cir. 1987) (suggesting that possible
duty to warn is not inconsistent with § 1623 because if there is serious doubt as to the veracity of the
testimony, prosecutor may have duty to inform the witness).
165. 472 F.2d 272 (2d Cir. 1973). "We find ... disturbing ... the government employing § 1621
whenever a recantation exists and § 1623 when one does not, simply to place perjury defendants in the
most disadvantageous trial position." Id. at 283.
166. Section § 1621 precludes a recantation defense. See United States v. Norris, 300 U.S. 564,
573-74 (1937).
167 Neil A. Lewis, Exiting Job Clinton Accepts Immunity Deal; Admits Testimony Was
False-Long Legal Fight Ends, N. Y TIMES, Jan. 20, 2001, at Al.
168. Statements of Clinton and Prosecution andExcerptsfrom News Conference, N.Y TIMES, Jan.
20, 2001, at A14.
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